Mongol Military Strength
Guiding Questions:
- What is distinct about Mongol military tactics used by Genghis Khan?
- How much of Mongol military tactics and strategies under Genghis Khan are an improvisation of earlier inner Asia nomadic fighting practices?
- How effective was terror as a Mongol tactic of war?
- What role did the military skill and knowledge play in the overall imperial success of the Mongols under Genghis Khan?
Mongol Military Prowess
The Mongol military of the 13th century combined the characteristic strength and structures of nomadic warriors with the siege warfare capabilities of sedentary armies already found among the Chinese, Muslims and European armies, as well as a vision of comprehensive warfare unique in the Middle Ages. A few general observations about the Mongol military aims and practices recur in the literature and they include:
This meant that once the Mongols were provoked to war, they aimed not for plunder, annexation of disputed territories to become vassals, or receipt of tribute, but rather the aim was the complete subjugation of the enemy ruler, who would be either annihilated with his whole family or enrolled as a subordinate executor of Mongol administration.
From the very beginning of his new order, Chinggis Khan insisted that the destruction of the enemy be completed before the any soldiers were permitted to seize war booty for themselves. This rule was strictly enforced failure of which could lead to death. Once the battle was over, booty would be divided among all soldiers according to their merits and demerits, leaving shares for the great khan, the imperial family, and commanders (known as "noyans").
[Source: Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, ed. by Atwood, pp.348-354].
The Mongol military of the 13th century combined the characteristic strength and structures of nomadic warriors with the siege warfare capabilities of sedentary armies already found among the Chinese, Muslims and European armies, as well as a vision of comprehensive warfare unique in the Middle Ages. A few general observations about the Mongol military aims and practices recur in the literature and they include:
- The Mongol army inherited many centuries of military development:
- Destruction was the aim of Mongol warfare:
This meant that once the Mongols were provoked to war, they aimed not for plunder, annexation of disputed territories to become vassals, or receipt of tribute, but rather the aim was the complete subjugation of the enemy ruler, who would be either annihilated with his whole family or enrolled as a subordinate executor of Mongol administration.
- Incentives for fighting:
From the very beginning of his new order, Chinggis Khan insisted that the destruction of the enemy be completed before the any soldiers were permitted to seize war booty for themselves. This rule was strictly enforced failure of which could lead to death. Once the battle was over, booty would be divided among all soldiers according to their merits and demerits, leaving shares for the great khan, the imperial family, and commanders (known as "noyans").
[Source: Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, ed. by Atwood, pp.348-354].
| encyclopedia_of_mongolia_and_mongol_empire.pdf |
Task 1: Motives for Mongol attacks
ATL Skill: Critical Thinking and Communication
Vendetta and War
Read the following section from Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, ed. by Atwood, pp.349:
"For Chinggis Khan in particular, war was a personal vendetta against willfully defiant rulers. After his unification of Mongolia, all Chinggis Khan's campaigns were justified in one of three ways:
1) avenging past attacks by the enemy on Chinggis's ancestors;
2) punishing those who gave refuge to defeated enemies of the Mongols; and
3) punishing those who executed Mongol envoys.
Once defeated, the most hated enemy rulers were given derisive nicknames, such as jirumtu, "The Righteous," Shidurghu, "The Upright," or Xiaosi, "Little Slave."
Question:
Vendetta and War
Read the following section from Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, ed. by Atwood, pp.349:
"For Chinggis Khan in particular, war was a personal vendetta against willfully defiant rulers. After his unification of Mongolia, all Chinggis Khan's campaigns were justified in one of three ways:
1) avenging past attacks by the enemy on Chinggis's ancestors;
2) punishing those who gave refuge to defeated enemies of the Mongols; and
3) punishing those who executed Mongol envoys.
Once defeated, the most hated enemy rulers were given derisive nicknames, such as jirumtu, "The Righteous," Shidurghu, "The Upright," or Xiaosi, "Little Slave."
Question:
- Find an example to match each of the claims above and explain the link. (6)
- Find an example that contradicts these claims and explain how it would support your counter-argument. (4)
Why were the mongols militarily successful?
A number of factors have been discussed by historians for the military success of the Mongols - especially under Genghis Khan. Some of these factors included:
Professor of History and expert in Central Asian and Islamic history Michal Biran highlights a number of factors that led to the rise and success of Genghis Khan and the Mongols after him for a generation [see "The Mongol Transformation: From the Steppe to Eurasian Empire", European Encounters 10, (1-3), pp.340-361]:
Destuction:
"One major factor for both the Mongol success and the revolution it created was the unprecedented amount of destruction that accompanied the Mongol conquests, which resulted (among other things) in the annihilation, transfer and downgrading of sizable segments of the established Eurasian elites" (p.346).
Decimal system:
"A Second factor was the new organization of the Mongol army: Chinggis Khan retained the classical decimal organization but abolished its linkage to the tribal system: the new Mongol units often comprised people from different tribes and were led primarily by Chinggis Khan's nökers (personal allies),who became the new elite of the empire. The soldiers’ loyalty was thereby transferred from their tribe to their commander and beyond him to the Chinggisid family. The improved coordination of these newly created units certainly contributed to the success of their conquests." (p.346).
Existing Bureaucracy:
"The Mongols owed much to their direct predecessors on the margins of the steppe, especially their ability to combine nomad and sedentary territories and Populations under effective rule. These states provided the Mongols with ready-made pools of officials, experienced in mediating foreign rule, either from the indigenous bureaucrats and scribal classes of those states, or, more commonly, from ex-(or post)-nomads who were already active (mainly as bureaucrats, governors or merchants) under the Mongols' predecessors. The important roles of the ex-nomads, Uighurs, Khitans and, to a lesser extent, the Khwarazmians and Khurasanians in the ranks of the early Mongol Empire certainly support this notion." (p.345).
Ideology:
“Moreover, already by the time of Chinggis Khan, the Mongols had revived the concept of universal nomadic rule sanctioned by Heaven. Unlike their predecessors, however, they broadened the concept, to include their right to rule over the whole world, in both its nomadic and sedentary realms. The center of the empire, however, remained in the steppe (at least till 1260), as suggested by the establishment of the Mongol capital, Qaraqorum, in the seared place of the former nomadic empires in the reign of Ogodei, Chinggis Khan's successor (1229-1241). Among the renowned expressions of this newly conceived ideology were the ultimatums the Mongol issued to different rulers of the world. Indeed, unlike their predecessors, the Mongols were unwilling to accept the coexistence of rival claimants to universal rule: they did not leave the Caliph intact, as the Saljuqs had done, nor were they prepared to accept the legitimacy of another Son of Heaven, as the Khitans and Jurchen had done vis-à-vis the Song emperor. The Pope, another significant claimant to universal authority, survived the Mongol onslaught, but the annihilation of the Song in China in and, more importantly, the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, paved the way for major changes in these two realms.” (p.347).
Summarising, Biran observes:
"The Mongols did not arise from nothing, nor did they lack a cultural legacy of their own. In terms of political culture, religion, and military organization they continued along tradition of steppe empires, while in terms of their relations with the sedentary civilizations they were influenced by the legacy of inter-regional nomadic states that arose in Manchuria and Central Asia in the tenth to twelfth centuries. Combining these two traditions, the unprecedented success of the Mongols resulted in a situation which, despite many continuities, was more revolutionary than evolutionary." (p.340).
Military historians have also acknowledged the complexity involved in Mongol military strategy that goes beyond mere direct battles in the war theatre. Below is an account of the differentiation between two forms of military strategies: "The Classical Military Strategy" and the "The Operational Art". The claim is that the 13th century warfare under the Mongols can be classified as Operational Art that pre-dates modern attributions of it to be in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Criterion for Operational Art include:
- Tactics - especially the decimal unit.
- Training.
- Discipline.
- Mobility and speed.
- Reward.
- Adaptation.
Professor of History and expert in Central Asian and Islamic history Michal Biran highlights a number of factors that led to the rise and success of Genghis Khan and the Mongols after him for a generation [see "The Mongol Transformation: From the Steppe to Eurasian Empire", European Encounters 10, (1-3), pp.340-361]:
Destuction:
"One major factor for both the Mongol success and the revolution it created was the unprecedented amount of destruction that accompanied the Mongol conquests, which resulted (among other things) in the annihilation, transfer and downgrading of sizable segments of the established Eurasian elites" (p.346).
Decimal system:
"A Second factor was the new organization of the Mongol army: Chinggis Khan retained the classical decimal organization but abolished its linkage to the tribal system: the new Mongol units often comprised people from different tribes and were led primarily by Chinggis Khan's nökers (personal allies),who became the new elite of the empire. The soldiers’ loyalty was thereby transferred from their tribe to their commander and beyond him to the Chinggisid family. The improved coordination of these newly created units certainly contributed to the success of their conquests." (p.346).
Existing Bureaucracy:
"The Mongols owed much to their direct predecessors on the margins of the steppe, especially their ability to combine nomad and sedentary territories and Populations under effective rule. These states provided the Mongols with ready-made pools of officials, experienced in mediating foreign rule, either from the indigenous bureaucrats and scribal classes of those states, or, more commonly, from ex-(or post)-nomads who were already active (mainly as bureaucrats, governors or merchants) under the Mongols' predecessors. The important roles of the ex-nomads, Uighurs, Khitans and, to a lesser extent, the Khwarazmians and Khurasanians in the ranks of the early Mongol Empire certainly support this notion." (p.345).
Ideology:
“Moreover, already by the time of Chinggis Khan, the Mongols had revived the concept of universal nomadic rule sanctioned by Heaven. Unlike their predecessors, however, they broadened the concept, to include their right to rule over the whole world, in both its nomadic and sedentary realms. The center of the empire, however, remained in the steppe (at least till 1260), as suggested by the establishment of the Mongol capital, Qaraqorum, in the seared place of the former nomadic empires in the reign of Ogodei, Chinggis Khan's successor (1229-1241). Among the renowned expressions of this newly conceived ideology were the ultimatums the Mongol issued to different rulers of the world. Indeed, unlike their predecessors, the Mongols were unwilling to accept the coexistence of rival claimants to universal rule: they did not leave the Caliph intact, as the Saljuqs had done, nor were they prepared to accept the legitimacy of another Son of Heaven, as the Khitans and Jurchen had done vis-à-vis the Song emperor. The Pope, another significant claimant to universal authority, survived the Mongol onslaught, but the annihilation of the Song in China in and, more importantly, the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, paved the way for major changes in these two realms.” (p.347).
Summarising, Biran observes:
"The Mongols did not arise from nothing, nor did they lack a cultural legacy of their own. In terms of political culture, religion, and military organization they continued along tradition of steppe empires, while in terms of their relations with the sedentary civilizations they were influenced by the legacy of inter-regional nomadic states that arose in Manchuria and Central Asia in the tenth to twelfth centuries. Combining these two traditions, the unprecedented success of the Mongols resulted in a situation which, despite many continuities, was more revolutionary than evolutionary." (p.340).
Military historians have also acknowledged the complexity involved in Mongol military strategy that goes beyond mere direct battles in the war theatre. Below is an account of the differentiation between two forms of military strategies: "The Classical Military Strategy" and the "The Operational Art". The claim is that the 13th century warfare under the Mongols can be classified as Operational Art that pre-dates modern attributions of it to be in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Criterion for Operational Art include:
- The identification of military strategic goals, i.e. to determine a focus of the entire campaign from start to finish. Military strategic goals should include an achievable military endstate.
- Establishing military conditions, i.e. anything that will help achieve the strategic goals.
- Sequential and simultaneous operations, i.e. planning combat power to occur in space and time.
- Resource allocation, e.g. organizing the theater, identifying lines of support, assigning missions and orchestrating operational functions, etc.
- Broad operational vision, i.e. looking beyond a mere battle to the longer term strategic goals.
Why did the mongols expand?
See the keynote address by Professor Nicola Di Cosmo (from 50 mins) entitled: “Environmental Perspectives on the Mongol Empire: What Climate Variability May Tell Us About the Mongol Expansion”, Institute for Advanced Study
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Mongol Military strategy
TacticsTactics are the component of war that deals with the preparation and conduct of battle. It also involves the most suitable method or form of combat to achieve specific military aims. Generic tactics in battle used by Genghis Khan and the Mongols after him include the following:
The Mongols under Genghis Khan's supervision were was reformed and reorganised into decimal units. Each delegate received responsibility and their respective military titles. In this way, the Mongol tribal organisation developed the nucleus of their military strength. Even in peacetime all able-bodied men between fifteen and sixty years of age were under military orders and put under automatic subscription. This meant that they could be called upon to fight at any time. Promotion through the military ranks in the Mongol army or army delegates were chosen either by their blood association of the Khan family or by military-related meritocracy.
Military title and number of men:
Arban (= 10s);
Zuun (= 100s);
Mingghan [myangan] (= 1000s) and
Tumen (10,000s).
The tribal links of the various clan groups were broken up by the army structure to ensure that any old loyalties could not threaten Mongol unity. In battle, the close-knit and tightly drilled units used skills developed in the traditional Mongol hunt, encircling, trapping and then shredding the enemy to pieces.
Moreover, transferring between these units was not allowed. The leaders within each strata or level had significant license to execute their orders in the way they considered it best to do. This command structure proved to be highly flexible and allowed the Mongol army to attack en masse, divide into somewhat smaller units to encircle and lead enemies into an ambush, or divide into small groups of 10 to mop up a fleeing and broken army. Individual soldiers were responsible for their equipment, weapons, and up to five mounts, although they fought as part of a sub-army unit. Their families and herds would accompany them on foreign expeditions as well.
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Decimal System
Question:
Terror
Ostrowski writes in "Genghis Khan (ca. 1162-1227)", pp.7-8:
Throughout his campaigns, Chinggis Khan followed a policy of pillaging any city that resisted and of selling the inhabitants into slavery but of sparing cities and people that capitulated peacefully. The idea was to encourage the next city to be attacked to surrender without a fight and be spared. This form of psychological warfare was not invented by Chinggis Khan, but he used it so effectively that his reputation as a ruthless marauder constantly seeking revenge became well established.
David Morgan writes about the possible causes behind the use of terror by the Mongols as a war tactic, "Mongol Terror" in International Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Chicago-London: Dearborn Publishers, 1997, p.42:
Mongol men were hardened soldiers from adolescence. They were not, however, enthusiastic about dying unnecessarily in battle. They were always anxious to avoid Mongol casualties as much as possible, so to ensure that any dying was done by others, the Mongols used terror [...] according to contemporary sources, the Mongols would put to death the entire population of a city...the Mongols seemed to have regarded such massacres as a military necessity, not as a form of sadistic enjoyment. The rationale behind such savagery was clear: it was designed to reduce future Mongol casualties.
The Wikipedia entry has this on the Mongol terror tactic:
The success of Mongol tactics hinged on fear: to induce capitulation amongst enemy populations…although perceived as being bloodthirsty, the Mongol strategy of "surrender or die" still recognized that conquest by capitulation was more desirable than being forced to continually expend soldiers, food, and money to fight every army and sack every town and city along the campaign's route. The Mongols frequently faced states with armies and resources greater than their own.
[…]
Thus whenever possible, by using the "promise" of wholesale execution for resistance, Mongol forces made efficient conquests, in turn allowing them to attack multiple targets and redirect soldiers and matériel where most needed. The reputation of guaranteed wholesale enactment on those who fought them was also the primary reason why the Mongols could hold vast territories long after their main force had moved on.
[…]
The linchpin of Mongol success was the widespread perception amongst their enemies that they were facing an insurmountable juggernaut that could only be placated by surrender. The Mongols may have counted on reports of horrifying massacres and torture to terrify their foes. The goal was to convince all-and-sundry that the costs of surrendering were not nearly onerous enough to risk an un-winnable war, given the guarantee of complete annihilation if they lost. This strategy was partially adopted because of the Mongols' lesser numbers; if their opponents are not sufficiently subdued, there was a greater chance they can rise again and attack the Mongols when the Mongols left to deal with another town and settlements. This way they technically covered their rear and flanks, and avoided a situation in which they would have to again engage a people they already fought and subdued, thereby saving resources, in their point of view, from an unnecessary second engagement. As Mongol conquest spread, this form of psychological warfare proved effective at suppressing resistance to Mongol rule…
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Terror
Question:
In your opinion, how effective do you think terror as a tactic of war is? Explain your answer giving at least two points. (5)
[note: award 1 mark for each point and 2-3 points based on the depth, accuracy and relevance of the explanation].
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: essay question
Question:
"The thirteenth century Mongol operations were unprecedented because of the vast distances involved, the intricate synchronization of operations, the dispersion of forces and the planning, preparation, and coordination of operations." To what extent do you agree with this assessment? (15).
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: essay question
Question:
"The linchpin of Mongol success was the widespread perception amongst their enemies that they were facing an insurmountable juggernaut that could only be placated by surrender." To what extent do you agree with this statement? (15).
Combat tactics
In Sandra Alvarez's post here, she lists 16 effective battle tactics used by Genghis Khan during his military campaigns:
1) Crow Soldiers and Scattered Stars Tactics (also known as Ocean Waves Tactics).
2) The Cavalrymen Charge Tactics (also known as Chisel Attack Tactics).
3) Archers’ Tactics.
4) Throw-Into-Disorder Tactics.
5) Wearing-Down Tactics.
6) Confusing and Intimidating.
7) Luring into Ambushes.
8) Arc Formation Tactics.
9) Lightning Attack And Surprise Attack.
10) Outflanking Tactics.
11) Encircling Tactics.
12) Open-the-End Tactics.
13) Combining Swords and Arrows.
14) Hot Pursuit Tactics and Dispersing Tactics.
15) Bush Clump Tactics.
16) Outflanking Tactics.
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Tactics
Using the website link here, select three of the tactics from the 16 listed above then describe them and outline their effectiveness. (6)
[note: give 1 mark for describing each tactic and 1 mark for outlining the effectiveness of each tactic].
Trainingal-Juwayni in the History of the World Conqueror, p.27-28 outlines the formal system of Mongol training that is equivalent to the modern military field exercise.
It was a "great hunt" (called nerge or battue) and was first instituted by Genghis Khan in order to instill command and control prior to combat as well as training preparation and familiarity with tactics:
[Chinggis Khan] paid great attention to the chase and used to say that the hunting of wild beasts was a proper occupation for the commanders of armies; and that instruction and training therein was incumbent upon warriors and men-at-arms, [who should learn] how the huntsmen come up with quarry, how they hunt it, in what manner they array themselves and after what fashion they surround it according as the party is great or small .... they become accustomed and inured to hunting and familiarized with the handling of the bow and the endurance of hardships...
Discipline
The Mongol army was highly disciplined. For Genghis Khan, discipline meant Mongol unity and longevity. It also meant preventing any rebellion or insubordination. This would further prevent any chaotic or erratic behaviour within the ranks or on the battle field.
In Świętosławski's article "The Organisation of the Mongol's War Expeditions in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries" in FASCICULI ARCHAEOLOGIAE HISTORICAE (tr. by Poklewska-Parra), p.38, it explains the strict enforcement of discipline Genghis Khan ensured in order to maintain the readiness of his army:
In History Alive 8, p.228 it has:
One of the most important features of the Mongol army was the principle of strict discipline known as Yasa, meaning an order or decree. The thirteenth century writer Juvaini explains the Yasa as a ‘rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance while for every crime [there was] a penalty’.
Genghis Khan was unable to read and write because Mongol civilisation had not developed literacy. Adapting Uigher script from the northern Turkic tribe, the Great Khan had the rules of the Yasa written down on scrolls.
During wartime, desertions, failing to rescue captured colleagues, plundering without permission, sleeping on duty, fighting with other tribal groups within the army and showing unnecessary kindness to a captive were all punishable by death.
Below are some of the Yasa decrees on discipline and military:
The above consequences are confirmed by al-Juwayni in The History of the World Conqueror, p.32:
When the line goes into battle, if one or two or three or more flee, from the squad of ten, all ten are killed; and if all ten flee, unless the rest of the hundred, all of them are killed. Briefly, unless they give way together, all who flee are killed. Also, if one. or two or more proceed daringly into the fight and the remainder of the ten do not follow, they are killed; and if one or more of the ten is captured and the other comrades do not free them, again they are killed.
ATL Skill: Critical Thinking and CommunicationTask: Discipline
Question:
1. Why do you think Genghis Khan lay so much emphasis on discipline? State two reasons.
2. Could it be argued that the Mongols were organised through fear rather than independent training? Share your thoughts with the class.
Mobility and speed
The speed of the Mongol army was highly impressive and gave them advantage over their enemies in combat:
Mongol soldiers had incentives to fight. These included:
The Mongols were aware that their traditional weapons and tactics (steppe warfare) were not effective when attacking walled cities or fortresses. So they adopted large siege weapons from the Chinese, Persians and Arabs and developed effective new strategies, including:
- Chasing and hounding the enemy to exhaustion like in a hunt.
- Encircling the enemy like a hunting pack.
- Rapid attacks, i.e. hit and run by horsemen.
- Ambushing the enemy.
- Targeted shooting from a long distance (e.g. using spears and arrow showers).
- Organisational units (e.g. the decimal unit).
The Mongols under Genghis Khan's supervision were was reformed and reorganised into decimal units. Each delegate received responsibility and their respective military titles. In this way, the Mongol tribal organisation developed the nucleus of their military strength. Even in peacetime all able-bodied men between fifteen and sixty years of age were under military orders and put under automatic subscription. This meant that they could be called upon to fight at any time. Promotion through the military ranks in the Mongol army or army delegates were chosen either by their blood association of the Khan family or by military-related meritocracy.
Military title and number of men:
Arban (= 10s);
Zuun (= 100s);
Mingghan [myangan] (= 1000s) and
Tumen (10,000s).
The tribal links of the various clan groups were broken up by the army structure to ensure that any old loyalties could not threaten Mongol unity. In battle, the close-knit and tightly drilled units used skills developed in the traditional Mongol hunt, encircling, trapping and then shredding the enemy to pieces.
Moreover, transferring between these units was not allowed. The leaders within each strata or level had significant license to execute their orders in the way they considered it best to do. This command structure proved to be highly flexible and allowed the Mongol army to attack en masse, divide into somewhat smaller units to encircle and lead enemies into an ambush, or divide into small groups of 10 to mop up a fleeing and broken army. Individual soldiers were responsible for their equipment, weapons, and up to five mounts, although they fought as part of a sub-army unit. Their families and herds would accompany them on foreign expeditions as well.
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Decimal System
Question:
- How would you represent the decimal system introduced by Genghis Khan as a diagram?
- Why do you think the decimal system is important and effective as a military tactic? Give two reasons and a developed point for each reason. (4)
Terror
Ostrowski writes in "Genghis Khan (ca. 1162-1227)", pp.7-8:
Throughout his campaigns, Chinggis Khan followed a policy of pillaging any city that resisted and of selling the inhabitants into slavery but of sparing cities and people that capitulated peacefully. The idea was to encourage the next city to be attacked to surrender without a fight and be spared. This form of psychological warfare was not invented by Chinggis Khan, but he used it so effectively that his reputation as a ruthless marauder constantly seeking revenge became well established.
David Morgan writes about the possible causes behind the use of terror by the Mongols as a war tactic, "Mongol Terror" in International Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Chicago-London: Dearborn Publishers, 1997, p.42:
Mongol men were hardened soldiers from adolescence. They were not, however, enthusiastic about dying unnecessarily in battle. They were always anxious to avoid Mongol casualties as much as possible, so to ensure that any dying was done by others, the Mongols used terror [...] according to contemporary sources, the Mongols would put to death the entire population of a city...the Mongols seemed to have regarded such massacres as a military necessity, not as a form of sadistic enjoyment. The rationale behind such savagery was clear: it was designed to reduce future Mongol casualties.
The Wikipedia entry has this on the Mongol terror tactic:
The success of Mongol tactics hinged on fear: to induce capitulation amongst enemy populations…although perceived as being bloodthirsty, the Mongol strategy of "surrender or die" still recognized that conquest by capitulation was more desirable than being forced to continually expend soldiers, food, and money to fight every army and sack every town and city along the campaign's route. The Mongols frequently faced states with armies and resources greater than their own.
[…]
Thus whenever possible, by using the "promise" of wholesale execution for resistance, Mongol forces made efficient conquests, in turn allowing them to attack multiple targets and redirect soldiers and matériel where most needed. The reputation of guaranteed wholesale enactment on those who fought them was also the primary reason why the Mongols could hold vast territories long after their main force had moved on.
[…]
The linchpin of Mongol success was the widespread perception amongst their enemies that they were facing an insurmountable juggernaut that could only be placated by surrender. The Mongols may have counted on reports of horrifying massacres and torture to terrify their foes. The goal was to convince all-and-sundry that the costs of surrendering were not nearly onerous enough to risk an un-winnable war, given the guarantee of complete annihilation if they lost. This strategy was partially adopted because of the Mongols' lesser numbers; if their opponents are not sufficiently subdued, there was a greater chance they can rise again and attack the Mongols when the Mongols left to deal with another town and settlements. This way they technically covered their rear and flanks, and avoided a situation in which they would have to again engage a people they already fought and subdued, thereby saving resources, in their point of view, from an unnecessary second engagement. As Mongol conquest spread, this form of psychological warfare proved effective at suppressing resistance to Mongol rule…
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Terror
Question:
In your opinion, how effective do you think terror as a tactic of war is? Explain your answer giving at least two points. (5)
[note: award 1 mark for each point and 2-3 points based on the depth, accuracy and relevance of the explanation].
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: essay question
Question:
"The thirteenth century Mongol operations were unprecedented because of the vast distances involved, the intricate synchronization of operations, the dispersion of forces and the planning, preparation, and coordination of operations." To what extent do you agree with this assessment? (15).
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: essay question
Question:
"The linchpin of Mongol success was the widespread perception amongst their enemies that they were facing an insurmountable juggernaut that could only be placated by surrender." To what extent do you agree with this statement? (15).
Combat tactics
In Sandra Alvarez's post here, she lists 16 effective battle tactics used by Genghis Khan during his military campaigns:
1) Crow Soldiers and Scattered Stars Tactics (also known as Ocean Waves Tactics).
2) The Cavalrymen Charge Tactics (also known as Chisel Attack Tactics).
3) Archers’ Tactics.
4) Throw-Into-Disorder Tactics.
5) Wearing-Down Tactics.
6) Confusing and Intimidating.
7) Luring into Ambushes.
8) Arc Formation Tactics.
9) Lightning Attack And Surprise Attack.
10) Outflanking Tactics.
11) Encircling Tactics.
12) Open-the-End Tactics.
13) Combining Swords and Arrows.
14) Hot Pursuit Tactics and Dispersing Tactics.
15) Bush Clump Tactics.
16) Outflanking Tactics.
ATL Skill: CommunicationTask: Tactics
Using the website link here, select three of the tactics from the 16 listed above then describe them and outline their effectiveness. (6)
[note: give 1 mark for describing each tactic and 1 mark for outlining the effectiveness of each tactic].
Trainingal-Juwayni in the History of the World Conqueror, p.27-28 outlines the formal system of Mongol training that is equivalent to the modern military field exercise.
It was a "great hunt" (called nerge or battue) and was first instituted by Genghis Khan in order to instill command and control prior to combat as well as training preparation and familiarity with tactics:
[Chinggis Khan] paid great attention to the chase and used to say that the hunting of wild beasts was a proper occupation for the commanders of armies; and that instruction and training therein was incumbent upon warriors and men-at-arms, [who should learn] how the huntsmen come up with quarry, how they hunt it, in what manner they array themselves and after what fashion they surround it according as the party is great or small .... they become accustomed and inured to hunting and familiarized with the handling of the bow and the endurance of hardships...
Discipline
The Mongol army was highly disciplined. For Genghis Khan, discipline meant Mongol unity and longevity. It also meant preventing any rebellion or insubordination. This would further prevent any chaotic or erratic behaviour within the ranks or on the battle field.
In Świętosławski's article "The Organisation of the Mongol's War Expeditions in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries" in FASCICULI ARCHAEOLOGIAE HISTORICAE (tr. by Poklewska-Parra), p.38, it explains the strict enforcement of discipline Genghis Khan ensured in order to maintain the readiness of his army:
In History Alive 8, p.228 it has:
One of the most important features of the Mongol army was the principle of strict discipline known as Yasa, meaning an order or decree. The thirteenth century writer Juvaini explains the Yasa as a ‘rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance while for every crime [there was] a penalty’.
Genghis Khan was unable to read and write because Mongol civilisation had not developed literacy. Adapting Uigher script from the northern Turkic tribe, the Great Khan had the rules of the Yasa written down on scrolls.
During wartime, desertions, failing to rescue captured colleagues, plundering without permission, sleeping on duty, fighting with other tribal groups within the army and showing unnecessary kindness to a captive were all punishable by death.
Below are some of the Yasa decrees on discipline and military:
- The ruling that divides men of the army into tens, hundreds, thousands, and ten thousands is to be maintained. This arrangement serves to raise an army in a short time, and to form the units of commands.
- The moment a campaign begins, each soldier must receive his arms from the hand of the officer who has them in charge. The soldier must keep them in good order, and have them inspected by his officer before a battle.
- Forbidden, under death penalty, to pillage the enemy before the general commanding gives permission; but after this permission is given the soldier must have the same opportunity as the officer, and must be allowed to keep what he has carried off, provided he has paid his share to the receiver for the emperor.
- To keep the men of the army exercised, a great hunt shall be held every winter. On this account, it is forbidden any man of the empire to kill from the month of March to October, deer, bucks, roe-bucks, hares, wild ass and some birds.
The above consequences are confirmed by al-Juwayni in The History of the World Conqueror, p.32:
When the line goes into battle, if one or two or three or more flee, from the squad of ten, all ten are killed; and if all ten flee, unless the rest of the hundred, all of them are killed. Briefly, unless they give way together, all who flee are killed. Also, if one. or two or more proceed daringly into the fight and the remainder of the ten do not follow, they are killed; and if one or more of the ten is captured and the other comrades do not free them, again they are killed.
ATL Skill: Critical Thinking and CommunicationTask: Discipline
Question:
1. Why do you think Genghis Khan lay so much emphasis on discipline? State two reasons.
2. Could it be argued that the Mongols were organised through fear rather than independent training? Share your thoughts with the class.
Mobility and speed
The speed of the Mongol army was highly impressive and gave them advantage over their enemies in combat:
- Mongol warriors could ride 60 to 100 miles a day, unheard of in the 12th - 14th centuries.
- Each soldier had up to four or five horses that traveled with the army so he could switch to a fresh horse as often as was needed.
- Mongol ponies were small but fast, and could live off even the sparsest grasses.
- Mongol horses had great endurance and could run for miles without tiring.
Mongol soldiers had incentives to fight. These included:
- material reward in the form of war booty (riches, property).
- promotion through the military ranks.
- imperial recognition for bravery and efforts by Genghis Khan.
The Mongols were aware that their traditional weapons and tactics (steppe warfare) were not effective when attacking walled cities or fortresses. So they adopted large siege weapons from the Chinese, Persians and Arabs and developed effective new strategies, including:
- Catapulting large stones, diseased animals, and flaming naphtha bombs over the walls.
- Isolating the city and cutting off supplies to starve inhabitants.
- Damming or rerouting a stream to flood the town.
- Lighting extra campfires and placing straw solders on spare horses to make the Mongol army appear larger than it was.